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1. Civilizing criminal law for victims
Contemporary criminal law and criminal procedure are more or less patchwork-like,
more or less inspired by not always easily compatible principles and goals of
prevention, resocialization, social control, retribution and even respect for victims.
The importance of victims' rights and interests is widely recognized recently.
International rulings as issued by the United Nations and the European Union stress
victims' rights. Serious attempts are being made to legally institutionalize care for
victims in many contemporary legal orders. ('Victim' may be replaced by 'injured
patty' in case this last expression is felt to be more neutraL Here 'victim' will be
generally used.)
Patchworks of criminal law and criminal procedure may accommodate a fair
amount of such care, still victims' rights and interests may seem to compete with
other implicit principles and goals. For example: compensation for victims by
offenders seems no substitute for retribution. Even if offenders are made to pay for
victims' harm, such payment may not constitute offenders' suffering regarded as
essential for retribution. Also, such compensation seems to be unable to lead to any
preventive effect by itself, as potential offenders may well regard payment as an
acceptable price for crime.
Still, the main thesis to be defended here is that victims should not only receive
their dues but also, more generally, that criminal law and punishment may be
justified only in terms of compensation by offenders for harm done to individual
victims and to the general interest, enforced by the state. It is only in terms of
compensation for victims that offenders' suffering may be justified. Such
compensation may rightly be called retribution in its original sense, as of course a
core meaning of "retribuere is: 'to restore'.
Such retribution is to consist of material and symbolical reparation by offenders of
harm done to victims. Such a conception may be called civilized criminal law in at
least two respects. First, civil rights of victims to retribution as restitution are
central. Second, such retribution may be more civilized than actual criminal law and
punishment are. In civilized criminal law, punishment is no longer regarded as
infliction of suffering in the first place, be it for preventive, retributive or other
reasons. Reparation or compensation by offenders for victims may still lead to
suffering by offenders, as they may be forced to penal servitude or other service on
behalf of victims. But such suffering is a by-product, probably satisfying victims to
some extent but not essential for punishment as reparative retribution.
This shift from offenders' suffering to reparation leading to suffering as a by-
product rather than a primary goal may indeed answer objections to proposals for
replacement of punishment by compensation measures. Offenders' suffering as
essential for retribution and prevention is not lost when retribution is understood as
being restitution in the first place. Punishment by offenders' material and
symbolical restitution indeed goes much further than imposition of damages under
tort law.
Reform of criminal law and punishment along these lines is not to be expected in
any near future. Still, articulation of the foundations of criminal law and
punishment in terms of retribution for victims may lead to rearrangement of
criminal law patchworks on behalf of victims.
Outlines of this are to be explained here along the following lines. In § 2,
strengths and weaknesses of current theories of meaning and function of criminal
law and punishment are briefly discussed, both in their "apologetic" role with regard
to actual criminal law and punishment and in their possibly reformatory roles.
Civilized criminal law incorporates strong points in both preventive and retributive
conceptions. Mediation approaches concerning victims and offenders are not
incompatible with civilized criminal law either.
Fundamental for civilized criminal law and punishment is psychology of victims
and offenders. The importance of such psychology is not always recognized in
discussion of principles of criminal law and punishment. Relationships of
resentment, reparation and self-respect are essential here (§ 3). Realization of this
implies victims being the central dramatis personae of civilized criminal law,
leading to punishment ranging from simple payment of damages to life terms of
penal servitude (§ 4). Advantages of civilized criminal law include that offenders are
not just to suffer. They are to contribute constructively to rectification, enabling
them to gain self-respect by contributing constructively to civilized society (§ 5).
How can resentment, reparation and respect as belonging to personal relationships
be constitutive for essentially anonymous criminal law as enforced by the state?
Predominant among other objections is the "price list" problem (§ 6). Suitably
reinterpreted, current criminal law and civil law offer real possibilities for piecemeal
improvement (§ 7).
2. Problems in current conceptions
"How, if at all, can we morally justify the terrible things we do to people as
punishment (kill them or lock them up in cages)?" (Murphy, 1992; p. 689). Even
apart from capital punishment, this unexpectedly non-institutional way of stating
things reveals the pressing character of the question. Consequences of current
criminal law, even in highly developed and seemingly humanly acceptable legal
orders, are not just confined to caging and worse. Even short prison sentences lead
to lifelong suffering. Consequently, there ought to be really convincing
considerations justifying imprisonment as the standard punishment for serious
offences.
However, common attempts to justify some form of punishment in terms of
prevention and/or retribution and their many varieties, ranging from resocialization
to retribution as pure suffering for offenders, are not necessarily apologetic with
respect to actual practice. Indeed, such attempts may well be highly critical of actual
practice and thus be reformative in nature. But even in such roles, well-known and
long-standing criticisms against conceptions of prevention and/or retribution do not
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seem to be adequately answerable (see Ten, 1989 among others).
In preventive conceptions, realization of individual and/or general prevention
may lead to instrumental use and concomitant unjust treatment of offenders and
citizens in general. Also, preventive theories of criminal law and punishment should
not assume a false air of social engineering. Criminal law and punishment cannot by
themselves ban crime. Which is of course not to imply that prevention of crime is of
no importance. Thus threats of punishment may have important ordering functions,
for example in traffic law. In such applications of criminal law, prevention has pride
of place. But in prevention of crimes like murder, manslaughter and burglary, means
other than criminal procedure and punishment seem more apposite, like better
protection against crime, better education and, of course, more social justice.
Plausible parts of preventive conceptions play roles in civilized criminal law too.
In as far as penal servitude and other forms of compensation and reparation for
victims are no attractive prospects for potential offenders, special and general
prevention are welcome by-products of civilized punishment. In extreme cases,
even civilized criminal law may prescribe imprisonment if it is the only measure of
special prevention effective against dangerous offenders (§ 4).
However, criminal law and punishment are to be regarded mainly as offering
answers to crimes already committed, which is quite different from criminal law as
primarily aimed at directing human behavior in the future. Retributive theories are
on the right side here. Such theories are to furnish plausible criteria relating crime
to punishment. But where are the retributive yardsticks of degrees of criminal intent
and/or guilt and seriousness of crime on the one hand, and severity of punishment
on the other? How to compare such categorically different quantities, if they may be
qualified as quantities at all? Even highly articulate attempts do not seem really
convincing here (see for example Von Hirsch, 1993)
Civilized criminal law is reminiscent of retributivism and indeed may bring to
light its kernel of truth. In fact, civilized criminal law may be rightly be called
retributivism in a more original sense, "retribuere meaning among other things: 'to
restore'. Civilized criminal law aims at solving the "yardstick" problem by
determining degrees of reparation in terms of harm inflicted on victims in the first
place. This may not be simple an straightforward either, still it may be more
determinate than other retributivist criteria.
There are at least two basic differences between both retributive and preventive
theories on the one hand and civilized criminal law on the other. First, both
retribution and prevention are commonly conceived of as essentially produced by
offenders' suffering. In civilized criminal law, offenders' suffering is a by-product of
reparation and not the essence of punishment. Second, common to preventive and
retributive theories is an implicit conception of relationships of subjects and objects
in criminal law. With the rise of absolutist conceptions of the state, criminal law
and punishment came to constitute the means of reaction of the state toward
disobedient citizens, ousting individual victims from criminal procedure (Bamett &
Hagel, 1977; see also Bamett, 1998). In civilized criminal law, victims are to return
to the official scene, for so long exclusively dominated by the (active) state against
(passive) criminal defendants and offenders.
Mediation approaches may not be readily classified in terms of prevention and/or
retribution. Mediation is directed to restoration of victims' participation rights, in
unofficial mediation and/or before court (Christie, 1977; Christie, 1981).Though
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such approaches are not generally intended to completely replace punishment in
some form, they still need to be briefly discussed, as they seem to offer at least
partial alternatives to civilized criminal law as expounded here.
However important and fruitful such approaches may be, their value may still be
limited for at least three reasons. First, not all victims want to encounter offenders
(again). Second, questions about what to do in cases of offenders' ill will to
mediation may remain unanswered, in the absence of convincing conceptions of
material punishment and/or compensation. Third, mediation does not imply clear-
cut criteria for symbolical and material end-results satisfying victims' rights.
Civilized criminal law, though not at all excluding encounter of victims and
offenders in mediation and/or court procedure, relies on material solutions in the
first place.
Notwithstanding similarities of civilized criminal law with Braithwaite's
conceptions, important differences with his "offender centered" approach are to be
noted here. "Reintegrative shaming" plays no role in civilized criminal law. Shame
may be too strongly associated with loss of respect and self-respect, whereas
civilized criminal law emphasizes expression of positive sentiments and responses
furthering such respect and self-respect for victims and offenders. Also, civilized
criminal law is "victim-centered" in the first place. According to Braithwaite,
reparation relieves offenders' feelings of guilt and alienation that may precipitate
further crimes. The effect is said by him to be restorative not only to the victim but
also to offenders, increasing their sense of self-esteem and aiding reintegration.
Braithwaite may be too optimistic here. In any case, civilized criminal law does not
rely on such effects on offenders in the first place (see Braithwaite, 1989;
Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990).
3. Resentment and reparation
Impression has it that discussion of principles of criminal law and punishment is not
always fruitfully related to psychology. Still, such psychology may clarify important
concepts and conceptions relevant for foundations of criminal law and punishment.
Indeed, civilized criminal law is related to the psychology of wrongdoing and its
consequences for offenders and victims. Concepts of deliberate wrongdoing,
resentment, excuse, apology and (symbolical) retribution as reparation are central
here. However essential if not even categorical differences may be between informal
or even intimate relationships of victims, offenders and their relations on the one
hand and highly formalized relationships between criminal offenders, victims and
the state representing general interests on the other hand may be, still the same
basic concepts determine what is to be done.
An example from everyday life may clarify this. Somebody receives an invitation
for dinner at a friend's home. She appears as agreed upon, but nobody opens the
door. Later on, the victim expresses some kind of resentment to the offender, who
was not there when he ought to have been there. In the absence of convincing
excuses, the offender is expected to apologize and to try to make up for the harm he
inflicted upon the invited person. Thus he may promise to prepare a still more
elaborate dinner, as soon as possible. If to the contrary his reaction to the invited
person's resentment were to display complete indifference, then the victim would
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feel like not being respected. Then the indifferent offender acts as if he does not
take his own conduct seriously, thereby not taking himself seriously either. On the
other hand, if the victim does not display any kind of resentment at all, then the
offender may think of her as somebody not imposing any limits to the conduct of
others towards her. Then she will not be taken seriously either.
Indeed, freedom and resentment are fundamental to human relationships and
particularly to acting upon wrong done (Strawson, 1962). It is nearly unimaginable
to feel and display no resentment at all at deliberate wrongdoing as distinct from
what just happens to go wrong. Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonnerdoes not lead
to human understanding and sympathy, but to surrender of respect and self-respect
for victims and in the end for offenders as well. This holds good not only for more
or less intimate human relationships as in the example above, but also for
anonymous human relationships making up society as a whole. Hence too its
importance for criminal law and punishment.
In the absence of exonerating excuses for wrongdoing, expression of resentment
ought to lead to recognition of victims by offenders, apology, reparation and
reconciliation, as essential elements of human relationships. Though apology and
reparation may be only symbolical, without it there can be no reconciliation and
relationships based upon respect and self-respect. This is of basic importance not
only for victims, but for offenders as well. Offenders will not be respected by
victims and others as long as they do not take responsibility for their conduct and its
consequences. Thus both resentment and eventual reparation and reconciliation
between offenders, victims and others in society are essential for reciprocal respect
and self-respect, probably the most important immaterial values in life (Rawls,
1971).
Personal resentment of victims is complemented by moral resentment of others
and society as a whole against offenders. Solidarity presupposes such moral
resentment about harm done to others, as a kind of compassion essential for
community. Moral resentment is to supplement personal resentment in bringing
offenders to repair their wrongdoing. This holds good not only for personal
relationships, but also for moral resentment expressed in the civil solidarity of
civilized criminal law, assisting victims who cannot and indeed legally may not seek
reparation by themselves. Moral resentment may even be regarded as a form of love,
as solidarity in reciprocal self-realization. (George Sand wrote about wrongdoing:
"Humanity is outraged in me and with me. We must not dissimulate nor try to
forget this indignation which is one of the most passionate forms of love." [see
Mason ed., 1955; p. 166]).
Current criminal law and punishment at best is seriously distorted realization of
relationships of crime, resentment and reparation. Punishment as suffering for its
own sake is expression of resentment emphasized beyond recognition, leaving out of
account the core conceptions of reparation and reconciliation with victims and
society. Punishment as meting out mere suffering, for preventive and/or retributive
purposes, seems to be no more than painfully driving home the message that wrong
is done. Essential consequences of wrongdoing and resentment are fatally left out of
account, then. Nothing much more than irreversible and often lifelong
consequences for the convicted and not much good for victims is the result.
Expression of resentment ought to be no more than an intermediate stage in
restoration of human relationships for victims and offenders.
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4. Principles of civilized criminal law
Civilized criminal law answers to crime are to conform to the basic scheme of
resentment and recognition, leading to compensation and reparation for victims.
Moral resentment comes to the fore, then. The state, representing and realizing the
public interest, acts on behalf of personal resentment of victims and of moral
resentment of other citizens, in order to force offenders to compensate for harm
done to victims.
Still there are basic differences with reparation of harm outside the law. First,
prohibition of taking the law into one's own hands is of course essential. The state is
to intervene, though some offenders may voluntarily answer to victims' resentment
and offer adequate reparation outside official procedures. Second, apology and
reparation as feasible in personal relationships are to be replaced by some or other
anonymous form of reparation. In personal relationships, apologies and reparation
may assume different symbolical, physical and material forms (for example in
preparing a still better dinner). In criminal procedure, the only generally available
form of material reparation is transfer of money from victims to offenders, as
nothing else of symbolical and/or material value between anonymous victims and
offenders is available (apart from return of stolen goods and the like). Third, it goes
without saying that formalized methods of investigation, proof and determining
measures of punishment replace informal proceedings.
Civilized criminal law makes offenders and nobody else repair the consequences
of crime, by payment to victims and to the state. This may amount to no more than
payment of more or less substantial sums of money and/or other kinds of material
compensation. But serious crime is to be compensated for by penal servitude, the
rewards of which are due to victims and to the state. Such penal servitude does not
exclude additional payment by offenders. Five main points may further clarify this.
First, harm to be compensated for is not only material loss, but also bodily, mental
and emotional harm to victims and/or their relations and harm to general interests.
Also, offenders are to pay for costs of investigation, prosecution and execution.
Harm may be done exclusively to general interests as well, for example by tax fraud
or by risky behavior like carrying firearms, but also through fear that the same kind
of crime will happen again. Though such harm may lead to no more than marginal
personal resentment for all threatened citizens, it is still to be compensated for. Such
general personal resentment is to be distinguished from moral resentment as
solidarity with victims. Such moral resentment is more important in cases of serious
crime against specific victims than in cases of more or less petty crimes against
public or other general interests.
Second, civilized criminal law sentences may not always be very different from
civil law rulings determining amounts of damages. Still, criminal damages or fines to
be paid to victims and the state may be rather higher, as more harm is to be repaired
by criminal offenders than is to be compensated for under the law of torts. Such
fines may resemble punitive damages in tort law.
In cases of serious harm, punishment as reparation ought to be more than paying
punitive damages. Even though such damages may be much higher than would be
needed for compensation of material harm, compensation and reparation of
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resentment and related mental and emotional harm may necessitate offenders' labor
in service of victims, as more than just material compensation. Penal servitude is to
forcibly express the necessity of payment by offenders themselves. Such retributive
payment is created by offenders' own action, then, instead of consisting of money
more or less accidentally available to offenders. Also, penal servitude may be
regarded as material and symbolical undoing of crime by perpetrators of crime
themselves.
Penal servitude may have an air of traditionalist retributivism. However, the
important difference is the constructive, compensatory and reparative nature of
penal servitude. Moreover, such penal servitude is to be prescribed only in
reparation of serious harm and related personal and moral resentment. Also, penal
servitude may only be prescribed by a specific criminal code and may not just
depend on general criteria of tort. Whatever blurring there may be between civil
law and civilized criminal law, principles of legality have pride of place here. In
such a code, crimes such as murder, rape and serious maltreatment may indeed be
punished by long-term penal servitude. With few exceptions, such crimes have
lifelong consequences for victims. Though such harm cannot really be compensated
for, penal servitude may offer at least some reparation of resentment and
compensation of loss.
Penal servitude may be performed in relative freedom, but in serious cases
isolation from society is not to be excluded. In such cases, special and general
preventive force may be an added advantage indeed. Cruel and inhuman as such
penal servitude may seem, it may well contrast favorably with "mere"
imprisonment, even for offenders. Also, offenders may perform penal servitude in
all kinds of jobs, including skilled professions.
Third, absence of guilt and/or circumstances exonerating criminal conduct
exclude penal servitude, as there can be no resentment to be repaired in such cases.
Still there may be serious harm done. Such harm may be compensated for by
offenders' insurance. Vague boundaries between civil law and criminal law are
apposite here too. Also, public funds paid for by offenders may be instituted for
damages not covered by offenders' direct payments and/or insurance money.
Indeed, such public funds may be financed by all guilty offenders, as (a small) part of
their reparative action and related to the seriousness of their crimes. (This apart
from the possibility of public funds intervening in all cases of reparation of criminal
harm, again paid for by offenders: § 6).
Fourth, in many cases civilized criminal procedure may not be unlike civil
procedure initiated by victims acting as plaintiffs. However, crimes against
exclusively public interests, serious crime in general and/or crime not to brought to
light without police and public prosecution action may still be covered by criminal
investigation and procedure initiated by the public prosecution. Also, the public and
institutional character of criminal trial by the state may serve to symbolically
express moral resentment of the community on behalf of victims.
Fifth, civilized criminal law does not exclude mere imprisonment and other
forceful measures against offenders. Thus the threat of imprisonment as such may be
indispensable as ultimum remedium, even in civilized criminal law, if offenders are
unwilling to cooperate in reparation by payment and/or penal servitude. Also,
overriding needs for special prevention may still necessitate isolation by
imprisonment.
7
5. Solidarity with victims and offenders
Civilized criminal law is not just solidarity with victims, but also with offenders.
Penal servitude is more than backward-looking retribution by offenders' suffering.
It is first and foremost about reconstitution of community. Penal servitude is
offenders' symbolical and material return to socially acceptable relationships with
victims and citizens in general. Penal servitude is community service. Ibis holds
good for other civilized criminal sanctions as well. Here, again, the meaning of
resentment and reparation for a viable society is most important. Differences with
abolitionist and mediation approaches are readily apparent. Solidarity with
offenders does not imply lerting them go free, before or after mediation.
Such solidarity with victims and offenders contrasts with anonymous prevention
and retribution in punishment predicated upon all-too abstract relationships
between offenders and the state. Imprisonment is an expression of the
meaninglessness of exclusion or even of instrumentally preventive use of offenders
to so-called social goals that may actually be effectively thwarted that way.
Imprisonment as idle isolation does not improve offenders. Also, penal servitude as
meaningful work may have berter resocializing effects than psychotherapies
performed upon - again passive - offenders (see also Szasz, 1977).
Civilized crimina11aw may also offer rational and determinate criteria of
punishment. Though relationships of harm and offenders' guilt on the one hand and
retribution as compensation on the other may not always be simple and
straightforward, the basic principle is clear. Retribution for intentional or guilty
offenders is to be meted out according to harm done in the first place. Also, harm to
be compensated for in civilized criminal law does not include any self-inflicted
harm and/or harm experienced as a consequence of condemnation of conduct of
others judged to be immoral or obscene. Compensation in civilized criminal law of
self-inflicted harm is already excluded by the necessary relationship of resentment
with harmful conduct of others. Resentment cannot be related to self-regarding
conduct. Thus, for example, civilized criminal law does not cover drug abuse by
itself.
Current criminal law practice offers limited possibilities for victims to obtain
material compensation. Though punishment as merely meting out suffering may
have symbolical reparative meaning, tort law is to be appealed to in order to obtain
damages. But tort law damages may be difficult or even impossible to obtain in more
than a few cases. For example: in many legal orders, relatives may not obtain
damages for harm done to them by murder or manslaughter, unless they depended
on the victim for their living. In civilized criminal law, damages are integrated into
retribution as restitution. Also, victims' harm is more adequately compensated for
than may be the case in tort law. As a consequence, no separate civil lawsuits to
obtain damages are necessary apart from criminal procedure.
In current criminal law practice victims are often not even informed about
proceedings against offenders. Though civilized criminal law does not necessarily
imply active roles of victims as plaintiffs or otherwise in criminal procedure, it may
still be good for victims to be allowed to appear in court if they wish. At least
victims may be allotted the right to state the facts of their cases, even if their
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testimonies are deemed to be unnecessary for proof against defendants.
Lastly, as noted before, prevention has no pride of place in civilized criminal law.
But it is not lost in it either, even apart from preventive effects of imprisonment in
serious cases. Remember that the additional cost of criminal procedure and penal
servitude is too high a price of crime to be willingly paid by prudential offenders.
6. Objections
A basic objection to civilized criminal law as expression and realization of
resentment and reparation is based upon the absence of pre-existing personal
relationships between most offenders and victims. Recovery of respect and self-
respect by expression of resentment and subsequent expression of guilt and
reparation seems meaningful only between victims and offenders already having
positive bonds. Also, most victims are unlikely to have any interest in establishing
or continuing relationships with offenders. In the absence of such relationships,
there seems to be nothing to be restored and no sense in reconciliation of victims
and offenders.
This objection may be answered in part by stressing, again, that civilized criminal
law does not imply mediation, though it does not exclude such mediation either. If
victims are unwilling to encounter offenders, there still remains compensation to be
paid, not only to individual victims but also to the state, representing the other
members of society and their moral resentment. Nor does civilized criminal law
imply that criminal prosecution may be effected only if victims wish so. Even if
there would be no personal resentment and only suffering for victims, there still is
moral resentment to be repaired by offenders.
Absence of personal relationships between victims and offenders is characteristic
of crimes against institutions too. Think here of theft of a carton of milk from a
supermarket owned by a large investment group. There is not much room for
personal resentment then, as there are no specific victims experiencing any sizeable
harm. Here the weight comes down on moral resentment against theft in general, be
it from the poor or from the rich.
Probably the best-known objection to any conception of reparative criminal
justice is the "price list problem". Criminal law ought to be more than indication and
prediction of prices probably to be paid for crime (Watson et al., 1989; Zedner, 1994;
pp. 229, 239; Wright, 1996). There ought to be at least pouvoir symbolique de
condamnation, which is absent in principle in tort law (Van de Kerchove, 1987).
However, such prices may be quite high in civilized criminal law. The cost of
criminal prosecution is added to the price to be paid by offenders and punishment
may indeed include penal servitude and attendant suffering for offenders, still
further elevating "the price of crime" above any prudential level, that is, from the
standpoint of potential offenders. Civilized criminal law aims at integration of
compensation and retribution.
Against compensation by offenders' payment it may be also objected that transfer
of money cannot be the end of things in criminal justice. Criminal justice cannot be
just another kind of capitalism. However, no other kinds of material compensation
are available in most cases. Also, remember that civilized criminal law is no crimes'
price list and that penal servitude certainly goes much further than just transfer of
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money.
Determination of measures of punishment may still pose difficult problems. What
is adequate penal servitude for murder and manslaughter? Is not life priceless and
harm done by killing immeasurable? Ought not such crimes to lead to penal
servitude for life, to the most severe punishment possible in civilized criminal law?
Such questions, not adequately answered in current retributive and/or preventive
theories either, must in the end be left to the reasoned discretion of the legislature
and the courts. This may hold good for measures of punishment for many kinds of
lesser crime as well. Of course, tort law is plagued by the same problems: what is just
compensation for bodily and/or mental and emotional harm?
Lastly, civilized criminal law brings to light vexing problems in relationships
between criminal justice and social justice in general. Shifting emphasis to
reparation implies increasing reliance upon financial transfer from offenders to
victims. That is: from the rich to the poor, but from the poor to the rich as well.
Unfortunately, money is indispensable here too, as other kinds of material
reparation will do in special cases only, as with restitution of stolen goods.
Thus offences like common assault without lasting physical consequences and
committed without criminal intent may be punished by a fine to be paid to victims.
But such a fine may mean nothing to the rich, be they offenders or victims. As
offenders, they may gladly pay such a relatively small fine, as victims they may not
have any feeling of being adequately compensated. Poor victims may really be
compensated, as little money may mean much to them. But poor offenders may
inordinately suffer by paying even a small fine. All of which does not really add up
to justice, criminal or otherwise.
However, such arguments hold good only against punishment as purely financial
compensation. First, serious criminal intent or guilt may lead to penal servitude,
which hits the rich as hard as it does the poor. Also, harm done to institutional and
corporate victims, whether caused by petty shoplifting or large scale tax fraud, may
still be punished by penal servitude. There may be little personal resentment to be
repaired in such cases, but still there is moral resentment of third parties as a basis
for such penal servitude.
Second, criminal justice as a part of public justice may in principle imply systems
of fines along the lines of fiscal systems taxing richer offenders proportionally
higher. Public funds for covering the costs of crime may be financed more by rich
offenders than by the poor. Thus corporate crime may be fined not only according
to harm, but also according to corporations' wealth. This is not to imply that victims
of rich offenders are to be better off than victims of the poor. The surplus of fines
paid by the rich may still go to public funds covering the costs of crime. Here and
elsewhere it is clear that no theory of criminal justice may be expected to be
plausible without recourse to more general conceptions of social justice (see also
Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990).
Another advantage of public funds covering the costs of crime may consist in
avoidance of direct relationships between victims and offenders. As noted before,
not all victims of crime may want any more relationships of whatever kind with
offenders. Public funds may act as "buffers", also expressing public solidarity with
victims, as the state pays to victims for the costs of crime, then.
Apart from problems in principle, civilized criminal law of course faces legal and
other practical problems as well. Thus it has been contended that penal servitude is
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incompatible with (international) legal prohibition of penal servitude, which is
taken to come down to slavery. If as far as this is a problem at all, it may be
countered by offering imprisonment as a (fully legal) alternative. Penal servitude
presupposes availability of paid labor as well, both in society and from offenders.
Also, care must be taken to avoid undue influence of emotions aroused by victims
upon judicial authorities charged with determination of proof and amounts of
retribution. However, such practical problems do not appear to be more serious than
problems in current criminal law practice.
7. A civilized criminal law agenda: "Nichts ist praktischer als eine gute Theorie"
A paradigm shift is needed in criminal law theory and practice. (Though civilized
criminal law is not completely new, of course: think of tort-based criminal law in
Roman times and comparable practices in non-western cultures still effective
today.) In principle, civilized criminal law would be best realized by drafting and
enforcing civilized criminal codes. But this is not to be expected within any near
future, in any contemporary legal order. Compounding problems here is the need
for redefinition of relationships between civil and criminal material and procedural
law, though such relationships are of course far from unproblematic in actual legal
theory and practice either.
United Nations, European and national rulings serving victims' right point in
right directions here, but do not nearly go far enough, accepting as they do core
elements of the actual administration of criminal justice. As long as the essence of
punishment is equal to making offenders (and more than a few innocent convicts)
suffer, victims' rights cannot be really served by retribution in its real sense.
However, the relatively "open" patchwork of current criminal law and criminal
procedure may offer serious possibilities for gradual improvement in civilized
directions. To begin with, mediation may do in some cases, though it should be
emphasized again that civilized criminal law is not to be equated with it.
Negotiation between victims and offenders may not invariably lead to acceptable
outcomes, but damages may be more easily paid if offenders face less attractive
alternatives of prosecution and likely punishment. Mediation may even be initiated
by the police and the public prosecution.
If there is to be criminal prosecution, then it ought to be determined as much as
possible by principles and goals of civilized criminal law. Within the bounds of
political and institutional possibilities, the public prosecution may decline to bring
before court any offences not having clear-cut relationships with actual or possible
harm to victims. Again, this may imply low priorities for prosecution of drugs
trafficking, in favor of prosecution of serious crime like traffic in women.
In some legal orders, victims may sue for damages within criminal procedure.
This may be further promoted, given limited possibilities for victims of crime to
obtain damages in civil lawsuits. Criminal procedures may also offer possibilities like
suspended sentences on condition of paying damages.
If nothing else can be done, degrees of punishment within criminal procedure as
it is now ought to be at least partially determined by reparative considerations. If
personal resentment of victims and moral resentment of other citizens concerned
may be repaired by punishment like paying fines to the state only and mere
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imprisonment, so be it. Though such measures are at odds with civilized criminal
law, they may still be the things to do, given practical limitations and necessities of
prevention. Still, unpaid labor for the public good and related measures already
possible in current legal orders will in many cases be better approximations to
reparative justice in civilized criminal law. This holds good in cases of crimes
causing harm to general interests anyway. Indeed, some ofthis is waning in more
than a few legal orders (Zedner, 1994).
Lastly, some suggestions may make sense in current civil law too. Compensation
for immaterial harm may be awarded to victims of crime under tort law. Also, civil
courts may order preventive measures and default fines. Even punitive damages may
do some good, at least from the perspective of reparation and even prevention of
crime. Still, such latitudes in contemporary legal orders to be exploited for civilized
criminal law purposes should not blur Sight on necessities of legislative reform.
To conclude: the most important of it all may be citizens' and before all officials'
active consciousness of criminal justice as reparation for victims. It has been said
that there are almost as many conceptions of criminal law and punishment as there
are criminal law officials (and citizens). Nobody seems to really agree, everybody
seems to think and act as if all others are wrong. Patchworks or worse are the result.
Current criminal law practice may well be one more "prison we choose to live
inside" (Lessing, 1986). It is time for deliberation and liberation, not only for victims
of crime and for offenders. There can be no criminal justice without effective
attention to victims' rights. Important here are officials' effective attitudes, to be
oriented toward realization of victims' rights as the primary motive in their
profession.
To conclude: more often than not: such reorientation toward criminal justice for
victims has been seriously hindered by ever more punitive public opinions and
attendant politics, decrying and despising "soft" mediation and other varieties of
victim-oriented criminal justice regarded as "letting offenders go free". One last
important advantage of retribution as reparation by offenders may be its clearly
punitive consequences. As soon as this is clearly seen, and seen to be practiced,
serving victims' rights may be all the more acceptable to public opinion and thus to
politics. Anyway, and again, politics' and government first duty for now of course is
reform of the administration of criminal justice, by legislation, however piecemeal,
informed both by international rulings and principled insight in retribution as
reparation. The government and all bodies of public administration in Poland and
elsewhere may be wished all kinds of succes in this most important enterprise.
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